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Abstract
Some o f the. management problems in the Lake Kariba fishery are related to 
conflicts between different categories of actors. Principally, there is marked antagonism 
between gill-net fishing and the tourism industry. Artisanal fishermen are accused of 
engaging in rampant gill netting especially in river mouths that are officially closed to 
commercial fishing to protect breeding fish. The fishing activities o f artisanal fishermen 
are believed to reduce the population and individual size o f the Tiger Fish thereby 
negatively affecting the International Tiger Fish Competition o f which the fishery is 
globally known. Furthermore, the activities o f artisanal fishermen especially in fishing 
grounds adjacent to wildlife areas conflict with the notion o f wilderness upon which 
tourism in the fishery and surrounding areas is based. In order to resolve these conflicts 
the Department o f National Parks and Wildlife Management instituted a co-management 
arrangement in the inshore fishery. However, these efforts did not lead to a substantial 
reduction o f the conflicts.
The purpose o f this chapter is to trace the source o f these conflicts to colonial land 
tenure policies that divided the lakeshore into different spheres o f usage. These policies 
were aimed at promoting the emergence o f a major tourist industry. In the process, 
however, they led to the marginalisation o f the artisanal fishermen who have responded 
by ignoring the divisions and encroaching into fishing grounds reserved for other actors. 
The chapter further goes to show that although some changes to these divisions along the 
lakeshore have been attempted over the years and new management regimes instituted to 
address the conflicts, these have not been adequate. Primarily, this is because these 
adjustments and new management regimes have tended to maintain the existing status 
quo in terms o f land tenure' policies. The chapter argues that while co-management 
regimes are seen as reducing conflicts in the way a commons is utilised, they need to 
address the historical, social and economic contexts that have informed the manner in 
which that commons is accessed and utilised.
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Abbreviations Used
BSAC British South African Company
CAMPFIRE Communal Area Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources
DNPWM Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Management
FRN Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
GSR Government of Southern Rhodesia
LAA Land Apportionment Act (1930)
LKFRI Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute
SAFA Sub-Area Fishermen’s Association
ZZSFP Zambia/Zimbabwe SADC Fisheries Project
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Introduction
In 1958 a dam-wall constructed across the Zambezi River on the 
Zambia/Zimbabwe boundary was sealed to create Lake Kariba. The ensuing water 
reservoir became the largest artificial lake in the world at that time. At its maximum 
extent the lake covers a water surface area o f more than 5000 km2 and has a shoreline 
length o f 2000 kilometres. The lake is more than 200 hundred kilometres long and is 
approximately 30 kilometres at its widest point. Approximately, fifty-five percent o f the 
lake’s water surface is on the Zimbabwean side and the rest lies in Zambia. The primary 
objective o f undertaking the project was to harness hydroelectric power for the mines on 
the Zambian Copperbelt and to support the emerging settler agricultural and industrial 
sectors in Zimbabwe. The ancillary uses of the lake are fishing and tourism. To a lesser 
extent the lake is also used as a means of transporting goods and people.
Ecologically, the lake is divided into two categories namely the inshore or 
artisanal and the pelagic or semi-industrial fisheries respectively. The inshore fishery 
comprises o f fish species that had been present in the Zambezi River before 
impoundment. When the water levels in the lake began to rise these riverine species did 
not succeed in colonising the deep waters o f the new lake. Instead, they are restricted to a 
depth o f less than twenty metres leaving a vacant niche in the rest o f the lake (Sanyanga, 
1996). It is in these marginal areas o f the lake that artisanal fishing takes place. The rest 
o f the pelagic area was colonised by a sardine locally known as kapenta (Limnothrisa 
miodori). This sardine introduced into the lake in 1967. It is estimated that about 94 
percent o f the total catch from the lake consists of kapenta (Songore and others, 1998). 
As kapenta fishing requires substantial investments in fishing rigs and marketing it has 
tended to remain a preserve of companies and fishing, cooperatives with sufficient amount 
of capital.
Apart from fishing the lake and surrounding areas are also a major tourist region. 
This tourism is based on the abundant wildlife on the lakeshore and the undisturbed 
nature of the environment. The land tenure system that existed at the time the water levels
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in the lake began to rise were partly responsible for the promotion of the tourist industry 
in this area. However, there have been conflicts between artisanal fishing and tourism in 
the fishery. In an effort to maximise their catches artisanal fishermen have tended to 
encroach into fishing grounds reserved for the tourist industry. This has affected the 
operations of actors in the tourist industry. In order to resolve these conflicts the Lake 
Kariba Fisheries Research Institute (LKFRI), a branch of the Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM), instituted a co-management arrangement in 
the fishery. These co-management arrangements in the fishery were to be based on the 
same rationale that informed the Communal Area Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) that had shown success in the wildlife sector.
This chapter will initially give a background to the manner in which the land 
tenure system, which was to influence the manner in which the lakeshore. was divided, 
emerged. The chapter will then show how artisanal fishing developed in light of the need 
to make Lake Kariba a major tourist industry. It will then be shown how conflicts 
between artisanal fishing and tourism have been a major management problem in the 
fishery. The chapter will then show how co-management was introduced in the artisanal 
fishery in an attempt to address the conflicts.
Emergence of the land tenure policies
. To understand the existing land tenure system along the lakeshore and how it has 
contributed to the conflicts in the fishery, there is need to put into context the Land 
Apportionment Act o f 1930 (LAA). The LAA was a culmination of efforts made by the 
‘self-government’ that took over the administration of the country from the British South 
African Company (BSAC) in 1923. The new government, with the support o f settler 
farmers, used its majority to transform the prevailing land tenure system in favour o f the 
latter. Prior to this period settler commercial agriculture had not been competitive for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, most of the fertile land near markets had been allocated to the 
BSAC and other companies that were sympathetic, to its interests. Most o f these 
companies held this land for speculative purposes. Settler farmers were forced to open
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farms further from the markets and increased transport costs made settler agriculture 
unprofitable. Secondly, settler farmers could not obtain adequate labour from the local 
population because the BSAC allowed African farmers to participate in agriculture. Lee 
(1974) observes that the local agricultural market was almost entirely supplied by local 
farmers forcing settler farmers to turn to other agricultural crops such as tobacco. In this 
way local Africans were able to avoid selling their labour.
The above constraints prompted the new government to set up a commission of 
inquiry to make recommendations on a new land tenure system in the country. The 
objective o f this new land tenure was to make land and labour readily available to settler 
farmers. The commission presented its report in 1929. It is this report that formed the 
basis o f the LAA of 1930. Under the LAA the land in the entire country was re-classified 
into various categories. These were European Areas, Unassigned Areas, Native Purchase 
Areas, Native Reserves, Forest Areas and Undetermined Areas (see Table One below). 
Unassigned Areas were marginal land dispersed all over the country especially in the 
remote parts with harsher physical conditions for human habitations. Most o f these areas 
were found in the Zambezi Valley. Furthermore, areas classified as Unassigned could 
later be re-classified whenever need arose. The most fertile land near to markets was 
classified as European Areas. The LAA further abolished the provisions in previous 
BSAC legislations that had allowed African farmers to own land outside their Native 
Reserves and thereby increase their agricultural productivity. With the enactment o f the 
LAA they were now relocated to the newly established Native Areas in the drier and 
more remote parts of the country.1 Land in the Native Reserves was held under traditional 
tenure and user rights (Rukuni, ibid).
1 The Native Reserves are today known as the Communal Areas.
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Table One
Summary of land apportionment in Southern Rhodesia (1930)
Category of Land Square Kilometres % of Country
1) European Area 29946.54 51.0
2) Native Reserve 12874.29 22.0
3) Native Purchase Areas '  4548.57 7.8
4) Unassigned Areas 10842.78 18.5
5) Forest Area 359.97 0.6
6) Undetermined Area 41.73 0.1
7) Total 58617.78 100
8)Total for Africans (2) + (3) 17422.86 29.8
Adapted from: Government of Southern Rhodesia, Central African Council, ‘Comparative 
Survey of Native Policy,’ Government Printers, Salisbury, 1951.
As the LAA affected all the tenure systems in the entire country even the land on 
the banks o f the Zambezi River, on which Lake Kariba was to be constructed in the late 
1950’s, was also affected (see Map One below). The portion o f the Zambezi River from 
the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border up to about 30 kilometres just below the place where 
the dam wall was constructed was classified as European Land. Another 30 kilometre 
stretch o f land along the banks o f the river from the where the dam wall currently stands 
became a Native Reserve. For about 128 kilometres beyond the Native Reserve up to the 
Special Native Reserve Area the land was classified as Unassigned save for a 16- 
kilometre stretch of land that was classified as a Forest Area. As will be elaborated 
below, these classifications became instrumental in the emergence of a major tourist 
industry in the lake and surrounding areas.
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Map One: Demarcation o f land along the Zambezi River (Zimbabwe)
Land Apportionment 1955
I I Dam
I Natives Reserves
____Spedal Native Areas
L _ _ J  Unassigned Areas 
fe ffS i Forest aieas
| Native Purchase Areas 
International Boundary 
| | European areas
Adapted from: Government o f Southern Rhodesia, Central African Council, 
'Comparative Survey o f Native Policy,’ Government Printers, Salisbury, 1951:
\
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The emergence of sport fishing
While the area around the lake became a source of tourist attractions such as sport 
fishing the policies that supported these measures had been developed much earlier. In 
particular, the Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 was instrumental in the 
promotion of sport fishing in the country. While the act restricted the fishing activities of 
local people such as banning the use of drag, cast, stake or other nets and prohibiting the 
use of vegetable poisons it encouraged the promotion of sport fishing. The act supported 
the importation and introduction of exotic fish species in local water bodies that had a 
‘sporting quality (Hey, 1948).’ This led to a tremendous increase and growth of a sport 
fishing industry in the country. In 1938 trout ova were imported from Scotland for the 
stocking of the country’s water resources. Later an umbrella organisation known as the 
Trout Acclimatisation Act was formed to coordinate the operations of associations 
interested in the importation of Trout ova (Bell-Cross and Minshull, 1988). In 1944 the 
Southern Rhodesia National Anglers Association was formed. By 1947 similar 
associations had become so politically entrenched that they began to lobby government to 
amend the Game and Fish Preservation Act to give more responsibilities on the 
management o f water bodies to its members. Members o f the various Angling 
Associations were then recognised as Honorary Fish Wardens. In 1948 the government 
engaged a consultant to advise on the future of the country’s fisheries policy. His major 
recommendation was that the country’s fisheries policy should put emphasis on sport 
fishing to attract tourists. He observed that the restocking o f the country’s water bodies 
should concentrate more on fishes that have virtues of superiority in fighting ability (Hey, 
1948).
In 1949 the government passed the National Parks Act and created a National 
Parks Board. Due to the influence of the sport fishing lobby and the consultant’s 
recommendations even the new board’s policy thrust was to support sport angling in the 
country. The board issued a statement to the extent that sport angling was to be promoted 
in all water bodies except in certain fisheries such as the Hwange National Park where 
this facility was rendered unsafe due to dangers from the wildlife (FRN, 1955). While
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these sport-fishing policies had been promoted by lobby groups the new National Parks 
Board, the forerunner to the current DNPWM, continued to promote similar courses of 
action.
Division of the lake shore
When Lake Kariba began to form the different classifications that had been made 
under the LAA became useful in engendering the emergence of a major tourist industry 
in the fishery itself and surrounding areas. Apart from these land classifications the 
general policies that defined the manner in which the conservation o f natural was to be 
practiced in the country was also instrumental in developing the fishery into a tourist 
area. According to Tomlinson (1980) factors that had to be taken into consideration when 
creating a national park were spectacular scenery, presence o f numerous and diverse 
mammal and reptile fauna and the presence o f large water bodies with a potential for the 
development o f a wide range of outdoor recreational facilities. When Lake Kariba began 
to form all these factors were present.
The emerging water body was designated as a Recreational Park.2 The land that 
had been classified as European Land under the LAA was re-categorised into the Charara 
Safari Area.3 *This Safari Area covers a region o f more than two thousand hectares and 
includes all the area around Kariba town and borders the Kanyati, Hurungwe and 
Nyaodza Communal Lands. Another National Park with Lake Kariba as a frontage was 
also demarcated. This was the Matusadona National Park. This National Park covers an 
area o f more than hundred and thirty seven thousand square kilometres. The creation of 
this National Park was justified on the grounds that it was largely sparsely populated and 
the presence o f tse tse fly and a large number of wildlife could not make it suitable for 
human habitation (Taylor, 1989). Further, below the Matusadona National Park, on the 
stretch o f land that had been classified as Unassigned Area under the LAA, a Safari
2 It is for this reason that the fishery is officially known as the Lake Kariba Recreational Park
3 A Safari Area is a piece of land provided specifically for outdoor recreational pursuits such as camping,
sport hunting, fishing, photography, game viewing and bird watching.
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Reserve known as Chete was also established.4 Furthermore, a stretch of land measuring 
approximately seven kilometres wide running along the whole length of the shoreline was 
demarcated and classified as a Lake Shore Area. Permanent human habitation and other 
socio-economic activities such as farming and'livestock keeping, except in selected areas, 
were prohibited along the Lake Shore Area. By the time the water levels in the lake 
reached their maximum extent it was officially acknowledged that there were no 
permanent human settlements anywhere along the lakeshore except in designated areas.5 .
Fishing in Lake Kariba
As Lake Kariba became the largest water body in the country and given the 
National Parks Board thrust towards sport fishing soon became a major tourist area. To 
preserve this tourist appeal a number of controls on fishing activities especially by 
artisanal fishermen were instituted^ Areas adjacent to wildlife areas such as National 
Parks and Safari Areas were to be closed to artisanal fishing. Only sport angling was to 
be allowed in these areas. The only exceptions were fewer fishing grounds along these 
parts of the lakeshore that were allocated to white-owned fishing concessionaires. 
Secondly, fishing was to be prohibited in all affluent rivers and river mouths. This was 
aimed at protecting the spawning-runs of a lot of fish species particularly the Tiger Fish. 
The Tiger Fish is vital to the success of the Annual Kariba International Tiger Fishing 
Competition. The tournament was first organised in 1962 attracting over four hundred 
participants (Kenmuir, 1978). In 2001 more than two hundred teams representing about a 
thousand participants took part.6 It has now become a major tourist attraction in the 
fishery. As a result of these various restrictions only 60 percent of the lakeshore is open 
to artisanal fishing.
5 Zambia National Archives, Ref. No. SP 4/7/16, Minutes of a Meeting of Ministers held in Salisbury on 
Friday 11th December, 1959.
6 Source: wmv.mustad.no/people/fieldtesters/osborne
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Even when artisanal fishing commenced in 1962 further restrictions in the fishing 
camps themselves were introduced. Each of the Tonga and Kore Kore chiefs that were 
displaced from the banks of the river to make way for the lake was given a specific 
fishing ground from where his subjects only were to operate. The names o f some o f the 
fishing camps such as Dandawa, Nyamhunga, Mudzimu and Nematombo are actual 
names of the chiefs displaced from the river. These fishing camps were exclusively for 
fishing purposes only and permanent settlement and other activities such as agriculture 
and livestock keeping prohibited. This policy was also meant to preserve the wilderness 
of the area surrounding the lake (Magadza, 1986).
In 967 about 1000 artisanal fishermen were recorded as active in the fishery 
(Minshull, 1973). Thereafter, the number o f fishermen began to decline as a reaction to 
declining catches. It is estimated that in 1980 there were about 300 fishermen and the 
number increased to 700 between 1988 and 1992 (Songore, 2000). However, after 1993 
the number has declined to current levels o f about 300 fishermen in the artisanal sector 
(ibid).
Conflicts in the fishery
Two factors, ecological and administrative have been the source of conflicts 
between artisanal fishermen and other actors in the fishery. Firstly, most o f the fish 
species targeted by artisanal fishermen are restricted to the marginal areas o f the lake and 
in river mouths. This provides an incentive to artisanal fishermen to fish in such areas 
despite the restrictions Secondly and related to the first facto, the various demarcations of 
the lakeshore, that is aimed at accommodating the various actors reduces the amount of 
fishing grounds available to artisanal fishermen. This also prompts most artisanal 
fishermen to encroach into closed areas in an effort to maximise their catches. As early as 
1966 the Director o f National Parks and Wildlife Management was complaining that:
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The major function of the ranger at Kariba continued to be the enforcement o f the 
Fish Conservation Act and regulations. Illegal fishermen took considerable 
trouble to avoid detection and did not take kindly to arrest. On several occasions 
rushing game scouts and lusty battles disturbed the peace of the lake. On one 
occasion an illegal fisherman drowned while trying to escape while another had to 
be rescued. In one operation helicopter-borne game scouts were used, but illegal 
fishing continued (DNPWM, 1967: 4).
Such encounters between the DNPWM and the artisanal fishermen have remained 
a common feature of the fishery. Similar sentiments were still being some twenty years 
after the above observations had been made (DNPWM, 1996). Apart from the DNPWM 
the activities of the artisanal fishermen are blamed for having a negative effect on the 
tourism sector in the fishery. Fishermen are accused of fishing in river estuaries thereby 
having a deleterious effect on most spawning species especially the Tiger Fish which has 
the best fighting abilities among the fish species in the lake. Most of the tour operators 
believe that the quality of the Tiger Fish has declined to such levels that it has affected 
the internationally acclaimed Annual Lake Kariba Tiger Fish Competition. In turn this is 
said to have led to a decline in the occupancy rate of the hotels and lodges in the area 
(ZZSFP, 1996).. Secondly, the setting of gill nets in unauthorised fishing grounds by 
artisanal fishermen is believed to affect the tourist industry as the fishing nets get 
entangled in the engine propellers of the cruise or angling boats. Thirdly, artisanal 
fishermen are accused of illegally settling on National Parks land thereby not only 
spoiling the wilderness of these areas but also encouraging other criminal elements 
involved in the poaching of wildlife.
Artisanal fishermen have responded to these restrictions and enforcements in a 
number of ways. Firstly, the fishermen have formed ‘early warning ‘ networks which 
alert members of the presence of DNPWM patrols. In some instances some game scouts 
from the DNPWM are part of these networks. Once patrols are noticed various signals are 
used to alert members. Canoes are submerged and nets removed until the danger has 
passed. Secondly, the artisanal fishermen do not invest in expensive gear such as 
motorised vessels. Most of the vessels in use are made of corrugated iron with a small 
strip of wood in the middle. Not only are these vessels conducive for use in river mouths
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but they can also be easily replaced once the DNPWM scouts confiscate them. Most 
fishermen are of the view that they cannot invest in expensive vessels for fear of having 
them destroyed or taken away by the authorities.
Artisanal fishermen insist that their allocated fishing grounds are not adequate for 
them to have high catches. This compels them to encroach into closed areas and river 
mouths where they are assured of good catches despite the various risks involved. Most 
of them liken their existing fishing grounds to bath tubs:
How do you expect me to have good catches in a bathtub? I have no option but to 
go and fish in river estuaries and if any other fisherman tries to stop me then I will 
retaliate.7
They view the fishing restrictions imposed on them as being unjust and meant to 
protect the interests of the tourist industry. Most of the elderly artisanal fishermen 
interviewed said that they endured a lot of hardships when they were displaced to make 
way for the lake. As this relocation severely disrupted their livelihoods they feel that they 
should be the main beneficiaries of the resources in and around the lake. They 
particularly single out the DNPWM for taking a heavy-handed approach towards their 
activities while allowing the clients of tour operators to fish in river mouths and areas 
adjacent to national parks.
Introduction of co-management
The conflicts between the artisanal fishermen and other actors threatened the 
viability of the tourist industry especially that which relied on the sport fishing. In 
addition, the DNPWM was increasingly finding it difficult to enforce the regulations in 
the artisanal fishing grounds in the face of dwindling financial support from\central 
government. In some instances the department had to rely on the generosity o f the tour 
operators to conduct their patrols. It is for this reason that in 1993 the DNPWM, through
7 Personal communication with artisanal fisherman, Gache Gache fishing village, 11/9/98.
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the Lake Kariba Fisheries Research Institute (LKFRI) introduced a donor-funded co­
management initiative in the inshore fishery.
The framework for the co-management plans were based on the premise that 
artisanal fishermen who operated on fishing grounds allocated to the Communal Areas 
did not have recognised rights to the fishery. These fishing grounds were under the 
jurisdiction of the local authority and were owned communally thereby making the 
fishery a “Common-Pool Resource” (Machena, 1993). This lack of clearly defined rights 
were responsible for providing an incentive to fishermen to over-fish and encroach in 
closed areas in the hope of obtaining high catches. To prevent these conflicts the new co­
management plans give the responsibility of determining who gained access to their 
designated fishing grounds to the fishermen themselves. The fishermen would, in turn, be 
empowered through appropriate legislation to monitor each other’s fishing behaviour. In 
particular, the co-management plan would ensure that fishermen did not fish in 
unauthorised fishing grounds. The blue print for this new co-management plan was to 
mirror the one that already existed in the wildlife sector known as CAMPFIRE 
(Machena, 1993, and Machena and Kwaramba, 1995). Under the CAMPFIRE 
programme the minister responsible delegates Appropriate Authority to a district council 
to manage all wildlife under its jurisdiction. Once it receives this authority the council is 
expected to pass it on to the village level. The villagers then sell hunting and trophy 
animals to safari hunters contracted to operate in communal lands and thus obtain 
benefits from the resource (Dzingirai, 1995) The money obtained is used to build schools 
and hospitals to benefit the local people. In the fishery this concept would work by giving 
proprietorship of particular fishing grounds to fishermen. These Exclusive Fishing Zones 
(EFZ’s) would be conferred in accordance with the Parks and Wildlife Act o f 1975:
Collective proprietorship is vested in the recognised inhabitants (or members) of 
the water base. It is a form of communal property regime in which user rights for 
the resource are controlled by an identifiable group and are not privately owned or 
managed by the government. The fishing community will have to determine who 
may use the resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the resource 
should be used (ZZSFP, 1998: 12).
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In order to put this new management arrangement in motion, committees known 
as Sub-Area Fishermen’s Associations (SAFA’s) were established in the fishing camps. 
Membership to the SAFA’s is open to artisanal fishermen only. A committee is elected 
from among the fishermen operating from each fishing camp heads the SAFA’s. The 
committee comprises o f a chairman, treasurer, secretary and resource monitors. Headmen 
in the fishing camps, who had previously presented the interests of the chiefs in the 
Communal Areas, were made ex officio o f the SAFA’s. The primary responsibilities of 
the SAFA's are to manage the fish resources in their respective EFZ’s. They are 
responsible for preventing unauthorised fishermen from operating in their zones. An • 
additional role o f the SAFA's is to monitor and enforce fishing regulations. In order to 
operate effectively three persons from each SAFA were chosen to serve as Resource 
Monitors. These were to be directly responsible for co-ordinating the enforcement and 
monitoring of fishing regulations in their respective SAFA's. The operations o f the 
SAFA's are supported by contributions made by members either as joining fees or annual 
subscriptions.
The co-management plan was to be part o f a Master Plan for the fishery and 
surrounding areas. This Master Plan itself was to be guided by the principal that parts of 
the lakeshore were still to be reserved for particular types o f economic activity as had 
been the case in the past. In its contributions in drawing of the Master Plan the tourism 
sector was particularly insistent that the largest potential for the expansion o f economic 
activity on the lake and surrounding areas lay with the tourist industry (Hutton, 1991). 
Therefore, other uses of the lake such as artisanal fishing would have to be treated as 
secondary to tourism.
The fishery is not likely to expand and the only way to reduce the current fishing 
effort is to reduce the number of fishermen. The lake could be divided into a . 
number of exclusive fishing zones in which the resident fishermen would have 
management rights. This may lead to them harvesting fish in moderation within 
their zones and policing it from poachers (ibid: 6).
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The DNPWM supported this position on the grounds that its enforcement agents 
were already having problems in controlling the artisanal fishery in its present form. It 
was argued that expanding the fishery by opening up new fishing grounds as was being 
advocated by artisanal fishermen during the consultations for the formation of the 
SAFA’s would merely exacerbate the existing management problems (Hutton, ibid). 
Apart from the conflicts between the artisanal fishermen and the tourist industry the 
DNPWM also noted that expanding fishing grounds would further compromise the need 
to retain some unfished areas in the fishery that provided a pool for restocking the fished 
areas (ibid).
Inconclusive encounters
Despite implementing these co-management arrangements the conflicts in the 
fishery have not been solved. To date the encroachments by artisanal fishermen into 
unauthorised fishing grounds have continued. What the co-management has achieved is 
to engender conflicts among artisanal fishermen themselves. Being a committee member 
of the SAFA has brought a number of incentives for artisanal fishermen. Committee 
members attend workshops in the resort town of Kariba while study tours to other 
fisheries have also been held. Due to benefits obtained from these activities it is not 
unusual for all committee members to be removed from office whenever elections for 
new office bearers are held. Secondly, the lack of permanency in the fishing camps, itself 
a reflection o f the land tenure system, has also affected the operations of the SAFA’s. 
During the rainy season most of the fishermen migrate to their Communal Areas to 
conduct their agricultural activities. During these period there would be very few 
fishermen in the fishing camps to run the affairs of the SAFA’s.
There are three major weaknesses of the co-management arrangements that were 
not addressed. Firstly, the co-management plans sought to re-confirm the existing 
divisions in the fishery in the hope of reducing the conflicts. It did not address the manner 
in which these divisions of the lakeshore have reduced the fishing grounds available to 
artisanal fishermen which is one o f the sources of the conflict. The delegation of
management authority to fishermen over defined fishing grounds does not address the 
main concern o f the artisanal fishermen that is lack o f adequate fishing grounds. 
Secondly, there was a deliberate effort by the DNPWM through the LKFRI to make the 
co-management arrangements an affair between the state and artisanal fishermen only. 
Other actors such as tour operators are not part of the SAFA’s. This has reduced the 
effectiveness of the SAFA’s in addressing their problems to other actors. Whenever, they 
have complaints with other actors such as tour operators they have to go through the 
DNPWM. This limits the role of the SAFA’s and the confidence that the rest o f the 
fishermen have in them. As a result, there has not been a reduction in the conflicts, as the 
other actors would like to maintain their privileges at the expense of artisanal fishermen. 
Thirdly, the role of the SAFA’s in solving the conflicts is also not well understood by 
most of the fishermen. While some artisanal fishermen feel that the associations were 
created to solve all problems related to their operations others feel that these need to be 
confined to monitoring fishing regulations only. For instance, fishermen in one the camps 
have had problems with tour operators in the area. They complain that the operator in 
their areas anchors his houseboats in their fishing grounds thereby posing a risk to fishing 
nets. When the fishermen were asked to resolve the problem with the operator through 
their SAFA’s, they responded that only the LKFRI and the DNPWM had the mandate to 
discuss such issues with other users of the lake. They did not view the settling o f conflicts 
as a role for the SAFA.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper sought to show how land tenure policies in the country, themselves 
defined by the colonial LAA of 1930, have shaped the relationships among users o f the 
Lake Kariba fishery. Although the LAA was designed to promote settler commercial 
agriculture, it had an effect on the way Lake Kariba was to be accessed and utilised. 
When the water levels began to rise various demarcations for various uses were made. 
These divisions marginalised local fishermen who had to resort to encroachment in an 
effort to increase their catches. These encroachments have led to conflicts with other lake 
users especially those in the tourist industry.
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In an effort to address these problems the LKFRI instituted a co-management 
regime that sough to confer rights to recognised groups o f fishermen oyer particular 
fishing grounds. However, these arrangements did not address the fundamental problem 
in the fishery. This problem is related to the various' divisions o f the lakeshore. 
Consequently, the conflicts that this new regime sought to address have not bee solved. It 
is submitted that to  enhance equity and sustainable use o f a commons there is need to 
address the various historical and economic contexts in which that commons has evolved. 
These contexts inform the current problems in the way commons are managed.
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